We analyze the Pareto optimal contracts between lenders and borrowers in a model with asymmetric information. The model generalizes the Rothschild-Stiglitz pure adverse selection problem by including moral hazard. Entrepreneurs with unequal "abilities" borrow to finance alternative investment projects which differ in degree of risk and productivity. We determine the endogenous distribution of projects as functions of the amount of loanable funds, when lenders have no information about borrowers' ability and technological choices. Then, we embed these results in a dynamic competitive economy and show that the average quality of the selected projects in equilibrium may be high in recessions and low in booms. This phenomenon may generate (a) multiple steady states, (b) a smaller impact of exogenous shocks on output relative to the full information case, (c) endogenous fluctuations. JEL classification nos: A10, G14, G20, E32.
Introduction
It is commonly argued that the business cycle is likely to be amplified in economies with imperfect financial markets. Different versions of this proposition are in [13] , [1] , [2] , [12] , [17] . When lenders are not well informed about borrowers' investment projects they may devise "second-best" contracts inducing the borrowers to take desirable actions or reveal some information. Since these contracts are often entailing collateral requirements and credit rationing, investment and consumption turn out to be highly dependent on the borrowers' balance sheet position.
Most models predict that the agency costs associated to informational problems in financial markets (monitoring costs, the degree of moral hazard and adverse selection, etc.) are more important in recessions rather than booms. In fact, agency costs are a decreasing function of firms' liquidity or collateralized assets and most models predict that these variables are highly procyclical when endogenized in a general equilibrium framework.
One problem with this literature is that it cannot explain why booms may sometime revert to recessions. The idea that agency costs and distortions are negatively affected by firms' net worth is good for explaining the amplification of business cycles (e.g., the fact that recessions may last longer than predicted by the real business cycle models), much less for understanding endogenous reversion mechanisms.
This paper analyzes the relation between informational asymmetries in financial markets and business cycle fluctuations from a rather different perspective. We explore the effects of asymmetric information in financial markets by focusing on the joint effects of adverse selection and moral hazard in a world with heterogeneous entrepreneurs and investment projects. Our goal is to generate the distribution of entrepreneurs and projects in equilibrium and to see how this distribution evolves along the business cycle.
Projects chosen by a given pool of heterogeneous borrowers-entrepreneurs (differentiated by ability or location) can be ranked in terms of risk and productivity. Some of them are characterized by a higher probability of default and a lower expected output for given investment. Entrepreneurs have no endowment and they can only invest by applying for loan contracts. The type of investment projects that they choose is a function of the set of loan contracts offered by lenders with no information about borrowers' types and investment choices. We endogenize the distribution of projects by assuming that loan contracts are Pareto optimal and decentralizable (i.e., they maximize the borrowers' surplus over the set of incentive compatible contracts for which lenders' are making non negative profits under a "no cross subsidizing condition") and by imposing that the opportunity cost of lending is determined by a market clearing condition in the market for loans. Due to asymmetric information and limited liability, the social costs generated by the risky projects are not fully internalized and some entrepreneurs may choose to adopt them. The higher the proportion λ of entrepreneurs undertaking these projects, the higher is the loss of efficiency and real resources characterizing competitive equilibria.
The key step in the paper is to relate the optimal contracts and the distribution of bad projects λ to the opportunity cost of lending (the risk free interest rate) and the amount of loanable funds. We show that λ is an increasing function of interest payments (loan rate times loan size) on good projects, i.e., higher interest payments and limited liability make the moral hazard and adverse selection problems more important. A rise in the interest rate induces a price and a quantity effect on interest payments. The price effect increases the cost of borrowing (higher loan rate), while the quantity effect reduces the loan size. If the quantity effect dominates over the price effect, interest payments go down along with the proportion of bad investment projects. As the interest rate is determined by a market-clearing condition in the market for loans, a rise in loanable funds may have a negative effect on the loan rates and a positive effect on the average loan size. Hence, when the quantity effect dominates over the price effect, the proportion of bad projects λ is increasing in the size of loanable funds.
In the final section we embed this framework in an overlapping generations model where the amount of loanable funds is equal to the competitive wage rate arising from a neoclassical production function. This feature allows for a characterization of the joint evolution of projects distribution and output and the evaluation of the impact of exogenous shocks. We find that the model may produce multiple steady states and that a rise in productivity increases the steady state values of the wage rate along with the proportion of bad projects. In addition, when the production function is not "too concave", a productivity shock has a smaller impact on steady state real wages and output in the asymmetric information than in the full information model. Finally, we show that the evolution of equilibrium contracts along the cycle may produce discontinuities in the relation between the amount of loanable funds and the opportunity cost of lending that may be responsible for endogenous cycles. These cycles may exist because the high set-up costs generated during the upswing (when more borrowers choose high risk and wasteful projects) may eventually grow large enough to decrease output and wages.
Discontinuities are possible in our model because optimal contracts are subject to a no cross subsidizing (NCS) condition. The latter allows for optimal contracts to be decentralizable in a competitive environment. In appendix 3 we show how we can decentralize optimal contracts as the Nash equilibrium outcome of the three stage game proposed by Hellwig [9] . NCS may generate "regime switches": an increase of the opportunity cost of lending may cause a switch of equilibrium contracts from "pooling" (borrowers get the same contract irrespective of their project selection) to "separating" (borrowers "self-select" by choosing contracts designed for their own project) or vice versa. This is the source for the existence of endogenous cycles.
The "cleansing effect of recessions", a phenomenon documented by Caballero and Hammour [6] in a different context, may be a way of describing concisely what may happen in our economy. During the cyclical upswing (when there is a large amount of loanable funds) competitive lenders devise contracts attracting a high proportion of bad projects; the opposite occurs during the downswing. In other words, contrary to other papers in this field, our model predicts that the adverse selection and moral hazard problem in financial markets may be more severe during booms than recessions. Clearly, the reason for these diverging results is that we focus on the equilibrium selection of different investment projects instead of focusing on the interaction between credit limits and asset prices along the cycle. The two approaches are not competing with each other.
One may argue that having entrepreneurs with no endowment is a strong assumption. In fact, the degree of moral hazard and adverse selection could be a function of the cyclical behavior of entrepreneurs' net worth so as to alter the dynamics of our model. In appendix 4 we show that, when Pareto optimal contracts are obtained by maximizing the borrowers' surplus, the existence of positive endowments does not significantly alter the results of the model as long as the endowment is small enough. In particular, if the down payment earns the opportunity cost r and if there is no cost of liquidation, borrowers' capital does not affect the nature of pooling contracts and it may reduce the set of economies for which equilibrium contracts are separating. Since our results hold under much weaker conditions when contracts are pooling, introducing an endowment may actually help in making our point.
By analyzing the optimal contracts between risk neutral borrowers and lenders in a model with both moral hazard and adverse selection, Chan and Thakor [8] reach a different conclusion. They show that, when lenders maximize the borrowers' surplus, the optimal contract involves fully collateralized loans and no rationing of either type of borrowers. However, in Chan and Thakor's model, collateral is a good that cannot be used for investment and borrowers have unconstrained access to this good. When firms have a limited amount of collateral and this is sufficiently low, credit rationing can still arise in their model.
Relation with the existing literature
Mankiw [13] uses adverse selection to show that a rise in interest rates may lead to a large decrease in lending and even a collapse in the loan market. This result is based on Stiglitz and Weiss [16] , where a higher loan rate may raise the probability of lending to bad credit risks thereby increasing the extent of adverse selection. Note that the model does not rely on the existence of credit rationing or collateral requirements. The model can be used to show that a small increase in the (riskless) opportunity cost of lending may have a substantial negative effect on real investment and it may lead to a higher degree of adverse selection. However, in this model, the opportunity cost of lending is exogenous. This is an important limitation, since the idea of a market collapse may no longer be true in a model where the opportunity cost of lending derives from an equilibrium condition in the loan market. In particular, one may object that, if all borrowers were driven out of the market, there would be a fall in the rate on deposits so as to restore market participation of at least some of the low risk borrowers. In addition, Mankiw only considers pooling equilibria, i.e., lenders have no way to devise separating contracts.
Our model parallels Mankiw [13] by assuming a standard adverse selection model where liquidity and collateral have no role. However, unlike Mankiw, we endogenize the opportunity cost of lending as an equilibrium interest rate on deposit, we allow for separating contracts and we add a specific form of moral hazard in the lendersborrowers relations so as to endogenize the distribution of borrowers in terms of risk and productivity. Since we show that, in some cases (when the quantity effect dominates over the price effect), the proportion of bad projects may be procyclical, our results are at variance with Mankiw [13] .
Suarez and Sussman [17] explore the possibility that the costs associated to asymmetric information may be more important in booms than in recessions. In this paper consumers have quasi-linear utility functions over two goods, one of which is produced by a set of entrepreneurs. Production takes two periods and the first period output is a deterministic indivisible amount. Because of moral hazard and limited liability contracts, the probability of success of any given investment project is positively correlated with the value of first period output. Since entrepreneurs face a downward sloping demand curve, this value is anti cyclical in equilibrium. It follows that a boom generates a low price of output and a low liquidity thereby increasing external finance. Due to moral hazard, this leads to excessive risk taking and a high rate of failure. However, the prediction that borrowers' net worth is counter-cyclical is at variance with empirical regularities.
Carlstrom and Fuerst [7] study a computable general equilibrium model based on agency costs and find that the output response to exogenous shocks is characterized by more propagation and less amplification than in the standard Real Business Cycle model. The agency problem derives from the costly state verification model of Townsend [18] and contractual relations between lenders and borrowers are assumed to be anonymous. It is shown that production of investment goods depends on two key variables: entrepreneurs' net worth and the price of new capital goods. Because of the incentive problem, the price of capital exceeds production cost and, abstracting from the role of agents' net worth, the model is almost isomorphic to a model with costs of adjusting capital. Then, a positive shock on agents' net worth increases the supply of new capital goods and drives down the price of capital. Since the response of agents' net worth to exogenous shocks is sluggish, aggregate fluctuations may loose amplitude while gaining persistence.
The model

Agents and technologies
We consider an economy with overlapping generations of two sets of agents, lenders and entrepreneurs (or borrowers). Each set has a continuum of two-period-lived identical individuals in an interval of size one.
The cumulative distribution function of entrepreneurs is G (with density G = g), where G is assumed to be twice continuously differentiable with support in [0, 1] and such that
The precise role of the above assumption will be apparent in section 4, where we derive the loan contracts allowing entrepreneurs to finance their projects. Essentially, the assumption simplifies the exposition, by ruling out a non convexity of the programming problem from which contract choices are derived.
Lenders are endowed with one unit of labor when young, which they supply inelastically to a large set of competitive firms engaged in the production of a final good y. Entrepreneurs are endowed with the ability to run investment projects, whose output is an intermediate good z. All agents save and produce while young and consume in old age only. Given this assumption, it is inessential to specify the utility function of the "old", assumed to be strictly monotonic. Good y can be consumed or used as a capital good for the production of z, which is an input (materials) for the production of the final good y. Capital and materials fully depreciate in the production process. Production of y is instantaneous and described by the following production function:
where A > 0 is a productivity parameter and L is a labor input.
Assumption 2 F (z, L) is homogeneous of degree 1 and strictly concave.
Under full employment and by the linear homogeneity of F (.) we can write:
where f (z) > 0 and f (z) < 0.
Prices are defined in units of the final good and we let w and q be the relative prices of labor and materials respectively. Then, perfect competition and profit maximization imply:
An entrepreneur s ∈ [0, 1] can undertake, in the first period, one of two possible projects, L and H. These are production processes taking one period to be completed. Projects are perfectly divisible and they require a set-up cost. In particular, if entrepreneur s invests k at time t − 1 in the j-project (j = H, L), e j s units are used to pay the set-up cost, while the remaining amount yields a random output at time t according to the following simple technology 1 :
This technology satisfies the following assumptions.
Assumption 3α j is iid across entrepreneurs and it takes two values, α j > 0 with probability p j and zero with probability 1 − p j . Moreover,
1 No qualitative property of our model depends on the fact that the set-up cost is proportional to the marginal product of capitalα j .
Assumption 4z
Assumption 5 e L s = 0, e H s = es, with e > 0.
Both project types are affected by two parameter values: the marginal products α j and the set-up cost e j s. Since the latter is a function of j (the riskiness of the project) and s (the entrepreneur's ability), the model is characterized by both moral hazard and adverse selection.
Assumption 3 is almost a replica of a key assumption in Stiglitz and Weiss [16] , i.e., projects differ according to a mean preserving spread of the marginal rates of return. The alternative assumption p L α L > p H α H would not change the basic predictions of our model, as long as the two expected marginal products are not too far apart.
Assumption 4 guarantees the existence of solutions to the entrepreneurs' profit maximization problem for a wide range of relative prices.
Assumption 5, together with 3, imply that any investment k yields a higher expected output with L-projects than with H-projects. For this reason we will occasionally refer to the H-project as the "bad" project.
Assumptions 4, 3 and 5 generalize the standard adverse selection model (e.g., Stiglitz and Weiss [16] , Bester [3] , Boyd and Smith [5] ) introducing a potential moral hazard problem in the relation between entrepreneurs and outside investors. In a pure adverse selection model projects are not choice variables, the output of a project is independent of s and, in general, of k, since investment is usually assumed to be indivisible.
We consider the above assumptions to be the natural generalization of the standard assumptions employed in the literature on adverse selection to a setting including moral hazard (however, see Bester [4] for a different approach).
The assumptions about the production of materials is where we depart from more standard models. Here we choose a simple condition to capture the idea that only the "best" entrepreneurs (low values of s) find the risky project more profitable than the safe project. While in Stiglitz and Weiss [16] the risky project yields, by the mean preserving spread assumption, a higher expected profit, in our model this is true only for the best entrepreneurs. This creates an incentive for some borrowers to select the safe project. The reference to a set-up cost is just a way, computationally convenient, to obtain this property.
Loan contracts and information structure
The type of an entrepreneur and his investment choice are private information, both before and after the realization of the random variableα j . However, it is publicly known whether an investment project is successful or not, i.e., whetherα j = 0 orα j > 0.
Since entrepreneurs have no physical endowment and projects yield no output in the bad state, the entire production of the intermediate good is financed externally with limited liability loan contracts. Namely, the borrower repays the loan when the investment project is successful, while no payment occurs otherwise.
As in many other applications of incentive problems to the analysis of business cycles (e.g., Bernanke and Gertler [1] , [2] , Suarez and Sussman [17] ), we assume that loan contracts are constrained Pareto Optimal, i.e., they are the best arrangement under which borrowing can take place, given the information structure. More precisely, contracts are obtained by maximizing the borrowers' profit subject to the lenders' participation constraint. Since lenders are only consuming when old, their reservation utility at time t is r t q t w t−1 , where r is a deterministic "opportunity cost of lending" in units of the intermediate good. When deriving contracts, we take r as given. However, this is an endogenous variable, which is determined, at equilibrium, by the equality between demand and supply of loanable funds. We will see that, to avoid trivial cases, r can be restricted in the interval [0,ᾱ] since, for r outside this interval, no lending takes place.
A contract is a pair c = (B, R) specifying the size of the loan and the amount of repayment per unit of loan in the good state. For convenience, the loan size, B, is defined in units of the final good and the amount of repayment per unit of loan, R, is defined in units of the intermediate good. This specification of c allows us to define the expected profit of an entrepreneur in units of the intermediate good independently of q. In particular, the expected profit at time t of an entrepreneur s investing at time t − 1 in the j-project with a contract c t−1 = (B t−1 , R t ) signed at time t − 1 is:
where e H = e and e L = 0. The presence of asymmetric information rules out contracts contingent on the specific realizations ofα j , the borrowers' type and their project choice. In principle, lenders may devise a continuum of contracts, each of them inducing self selection of s-types. However, in our model, for a given project choice, the borrower's ranking of the available contracts is independent of the type s. More precisely, if c and c are two distinct contracts, π j s (c) − π j s (c ) is s-independent for j = L, H. Therefore, there is no loss of generality in restricting our attention to at most two contracts (designed for each project). We call these separating if they are distinct, and pooling if they are equal.
Let C (r) be the family of optimal contracts for a given (next period) opportunity cost of lending r. An element c ∈ C (r) is a pair c s = (c H , c L ) (if contracts are separating) or it is a single contract c p (if contracts are pooling), with c j = (R j , B j ) and j = H, L, p. Separating contracts induce self selection of borrowers. Thus, a borrower adopting the risky (safe) project (weakly) prefers c H to c L (c L to c H ). Equivalently, separating contracts satisfy the incentive compatibility constraints, i.e., ,
. Whether c is separating or pooling depends on which of these alternative arrangements provides the largest surplus. Whenever pooling and separating contracts yield the same surplus, we allow for randomization. Namely, a random contract is an array c = (c s , c p , θ) with θ ∈ [0, 1] denoting the probability for the lender to get the separating contract. With random contracts, the lender selects the investment project after having observed the realization of the lottery over the pair (c s , c p ). If the separating contract realizes, the lender is free to choose the c H or c L component. By construction, randomization does not alter the optimal surplus. However, it is essential for the existence of an equilibrium in the market of loanable funds (see next section). Thus, the optimal contract c(r) is separating (pooling) if θ(r) = 1 (θ(r) = 0). The precise definition of the Planner's problem and the derivation of the optimal contracts is described in appendix 1.
Intertemporal equilibria
To simplify the exposition, we now define intertemporal equilibria when contracts are deterministic. However, as already mentioned, existence of an equilibrium may require a randomization. Later on in this section, we explain how to generalize the definition and the analysis to random contracts.
For given opportunity cost of lending, r t , a set of optimal contracts, C(r t ), and a proportion of entrepreneurs selecting the H-project, λ(r t ), are determined at t − 1. The aggregate demand for loans at time t − 1 is denoted as D(r t ), where
where
Since lenders work in young age and consume when old, the (per capita) supply of funds at time t − 1 coincides with the wage rate w t−1 and the market clearing condition in the loan market at time t − 1 is:
The set r(w t−1 ) of values of r solving equation 2 is defined as the set of temporary equilibrium interest rates. By the law of large numbers (with the usual caveat applying to a continuum of random variables (see Judd [11] ) and by the assumption that borrowers get all the surplus generated by the optimal contracts, lenders earn the deterministic gross return r on any unit of loaned funds. Hence, their (per capita) consumption at t is simply r t q t w t−1 . Since 
Hence, Z(r) =ᾱD(r) − M e (r), where:
is the aggregate set-up cost. The market clearing conditions in the labor and material markets are determined by Equations 1 (i.e., w t = AW (z t ) and q t = Af (z t )) and the equality between demand, z t , and supply, Z(r t ), of the intermediate good at time t: 
By trivial manipulations, we can more directly define an intertemporal equilibrium as a sequence {(w t , r t ) : t ≥ 1} satisfying equation 2 and:
where the remaining variables, z t and q t are determined by the conditions z t = Z j (r t ) and q t = Af (z t ). Evidently, for e = 0 (i.e., when all entrepreneurs are equal), the dynamic behavior of the real wage (and therefore, of materials and final output) is independent of the loan market. Intertemporal equilibria can be derived from:
In the next section we show that the above also characterizes intertemporal equilibria of the full information model.
Full information
When projects are observable, optimal contracts are contingent on project types. By limited liability, these contracts are a pair (c L , c H ) such that p L R L = p H R H = r and:
For w < 1, equilibrium in the market for loans implies
Then, all borrowers choose the L-project and the opportunity cost of lending is r t =ᾱ for all t. An intertemporal equilibrium of the full information model is, therefore, the unique monotonic sequence {w t : t ≥ 1} solving equation 5 with initial condition w 0 < 1.
To single out the role of informational asymmetries in the dynamics of the model, we only consider economies that, under full information, have stationary states w * 0 ∈ (0, 1]. The following assumption guarantees this:
Competitive allocations of the benchmark model are Pareto optimal if and only if they are dynamically efficient. As usual, we define a stationary intertemporal equilibrium as dynamically efficient if there is no way to increase agents' total consumption by destroying the existing stock of capital. This type of inefficiency (which typically arises in overlapping generation models) is ruled out when the marginal product of capital is sufficiently high. The relevant condition in this model isᾱAf (ᾱw * 0 ) ≥ 1.
Intertemporal Equilibria with asymmetric information
In this section we partially characterize the dynamic properties of competitive equilibria with asymmetric information. We first provide an informal discussion of the contractual problem and we state the main properties of the optimal contracts. Then, we examine the consequences of these properties on intertemporal equilibria, under a set of simplifying assumptions. These are the minimum set of assumptions guaranteeing the uniqueness of a temporary equilibrium interest rate r (and optimal random contract) for any given wage w. It will be explained in a moment that uniqueness can be insured whenever the set-up cost e is not "too small" (the critical size of e depends on the shape of the distribution function G(s)). Furthermore, we will show that, when e is big enough so as to guarantee the uniqueness of an equilibrium interest rate, r(w), the latter is a decreasing function and the associated proportion of bad projects, λ(r(w)), is an increasing function of w. We regard this as the "regular case" when the inefficiency arising from asymmetric information is quantitatively significant. The existence of a unique temporary equilibrium interest rate, r(w), has important implications for the dynamics of intertemporal equilibria. Indeed, when r(w) is decreasing and λ(r(w)) is increasing in w, the aggregate set-up cost
is an increasing function of w. Then, equation 4 becomes:
A detailed analysis of the dynamics of the above map will be derived later on in this section. However, it is immediate to see that the positive effect of an increase in past wages w t−1 on current wage w t is tempered by the rise of the aggregate set-up cost.
Hence, adverse selection and moral hazard imply a slower wage growth and a smaller impact of exogenous shocks as compared to the full information case.
When these assumptions are not satisfied, optimal contracts may not be unique and intertemporal equilibria may display a variety of different dynamic patterns. In the final section of the paper we concentrate on a specific type of multiplicity related to the coexistence of different type of optimal contracts (pooling and separating) for a given wage. This multiplicity calls for a selection criterion and it may be responsible for the existence of endogenous fluctuations. We postpone the discussion of these cases to the last section of the paper, after the complete characterization has been provided. The example shows that, for e below the value over which uniqueness is guaranteed, the model does not always behave (not even approximately) like the full information model. The reason is that optimal contracts may "switch" from separating (pooling) to pooling (separating) as w changes along the cycle and "switching regimes" are associated to discontinuities of the map defining the equilibrium dynamics.
Main properties of loan contracts
Contracts are obtained by maximizing the borrowers' profit subject to the lenders' participation constraint. The presence of a continuum of borrowers' types allows for many possible and alternative choices of the Planner's objective function. The propositions, in this section, state some of the most relevant properties of the optimal contracts. The analysis of the contractual problem together with the proof of all the propositions in this section are in Appendix 1. Although we provide some intuition for the results, the propositions that follow can be read, at this stage, as assumptions satisfied by the optimal contracts.
As it is customary in environments with asymmetric information, we design the contractual problem by imposing a no cross subsidizing (NCS) condition. More specifically, we require that (separating) contracts (c L , c H ) cannot produce a negative surplus for the lender when offered separately 2 . The (NCS) condition guarantees that optimal contracts are decentralizable in a competitive environment. In appendix 3 we provide a specific game form, with lenders (banks) and borrowers, which delivers (decentralizes) as a (subgame perfect) Nash equilibrium the efficient contracts used in the paper. As usual, the decentralization of efficient contracts requires an exclusivity assumption, i.e., each borrower can apply at most for one contract.
By the NCS condition, optimal contracts may be either pooling or separating (or both), depending on the value of r. A value r * ∈ (0,ᾱ) is called a switching point if c p and c s are both in C(r * ) (are both optimal). r * is called a switching point because, as shown in appendix 1 (lemma 4), for e in a generic set of R ++ , r * is locally isolated and optimal contracts "switch" from pooling (separating) to separating (pooling) as r crosses r * . The (generically finite and possibly empty) set of switching points in [0,ᾱ] is denoted with S * . From now on we will implicitly assume that e is either zero or it belongs to the generic subset of R ++ for which S * is finite.
Proposition 1 For all r ∈ [0,ᾱ], the set of optimal contracts C(r) is non empty. Moreover,
• C(r) is unique whenever r ∈ [0,ᾱ]\S * (i.e., whenever θ(r) equals 0 or 1);
• if S * = ∅, θ(r) = 0 (i.e., the optimal contract is pooling) for all r ∈ [0,ᾱ] and if S * = ∅, θ(r) = 0 for all r ∈ [0, r * 1 ) and some r * 1 ∈ S * ; • the optimal proportion of H-projects, λ(r), is strictly positive for all r ∈ (0,ᾱ) and
Proposition 1 guarantees that the set {r : θ(r) = 0} is non empty, i.e., a deterministic pooling contract is optimal for r small enough. The proposition, however, does not rule out θ(r ) = 1 for some r ∈ (0,ᾱ), i.e., the possibility for optimal contracts to be separating. Clearly, if θ(r ) = 1 for some r ∈ (0,ᾱ), proposition 1 implies that S * = ∅.
In the pure adverse selection model, if cross subsidization is allowed, Pareto optimal contracts are always separating. The loan contract offered to high risk borrowers is associated with a higher loan rate and it generates a surplus which can be used to subsidize the contract (generating a negative surplus) offered to low risk borrowers. The NCS condition imposes a lower bound on the loan rate of the (safe) L-contract. Thus, the benefit from cream skimming may not be fully exploitable and a pooling contract may dominate. This is a known possibility in pure adverse selection environments with exogenously given values of risky projects λ (e.g., Rotschild and Stiglitz [15] ). In our economy, instead, the presence of moral hazard and adverse selection makes λ endogenous and thus, separating and pooling contracts may be optimal for different values of r (or for the same r). Proposition 1 shows that "cream skimming" is not beneficial when the opportunity cost of lending is relatively low.
The following two propositions provide two alternative sufficient conditions under which switching points are either absent or unique.
Proposition 2 Let
Moreover, there is a value e o large enough and such that, for e ≥ e o , S * = ∅.
Proposition 3 If sg(s)/G(s)
1, S * is either empty or it contains a unique switching point r * ∈ (0,ᾱ). Proposition 3 shows that, for a large class of distributions functions, either optimal contracts are pooling for all r, or they are pooling for r < r * 1 ∈ (0,ᾱ). A specific case is the uniform distribution, i.e., G(s) = s, for which the unique switching point is:
In this case, optimal contracts are always pooling if e ≥ 4(1 − µ) and they are separating for r ∈ [r * ,ᾱ] otherwise. The general equilibrium properties of the model are critically related to the behavior of the optimal contracts as a function of r. The next propositions characterize the map C(r) when θ(r) = 0 or θ(r) = 1 (deterministic contracts).
Proposition 4 Consider a deterministic contract c κ (r) ∈ C(r) (κ = p, s). Then, B κ (r) is non increasing and R κ (r) is strictly increasing for all
Proposition 4 is in line with known results in the adverse selection literature. Asymmetric information may generate credit rationing of all borrowers when contracts are pooling and credit rationing of the safe borrowers (those selecting project L) when contracts are separating. Since contracts guarantee the lenders a reservation utility defined by the opportunity cost r, a higher value of r is compensated by a higher repayment R κ . Since high repayments induce borrowers to take more risk, the Planner reduces the loan size to compensate for the loss generated by the increase in risk.
Separating contracts (c H , c L ) satisfy two conditions. The first is the no cross subsi-
The second states, as in the pure adverse selection model (e.g., Rotschild and Stiglitz [15] ), that the risky borrowers are not rationed, i.e., B H = 1, and that they are indifferent between the c H and the c L , contract,
. When the NCS condition is taken into account, the latter implies that:
Rationing of safe borrowers is the cost paid in order to make a separating contract incentive compatible (cream skimming). By optimality, B L must be the largest loan size satisfying the incentive compatibility constraint of the risky borrower.
The proportion of risky (bad) projects λ plays a fundamental role in a general equilibrium. When r ∈ S * , this variable will be denoted with λ κ (r), where κ = p if C(r) = c p (r) and κ = s if C(r) = c s (r).
Proposition 5 The functions λ j (r) (j = s, p) are continuous and unimodal in
The particular functional form of λ κ in proposition 5 is immediately obtained by
, when contracts are pooling, and the equation
, when they are separating. For r ∈ S * , optimal contracts are a correspondence and the expression of λ depends on the particular contracts C θ (r) selected. Hence, for r ∈ S * and θ ∈ (0, 1), the law of large numbers implies that:
The basic content of proposition 5 is in the characterization of the proportion of risky projects as a function of r. The statement is quite intuitive. Limited liability debt contracts induce borrowers to undertake risky projects because of the lower expected interest payments associated with these choices. Hence, an increase in r has an ambiguous effect on the proportion of risky projects. This effect can be decomposed into a quantity (fall in loan size) and a price (rise in repayments per unit of loan) effect. This is the reason why, as stated in proposition 5, λ κ (r) is increasing for low values of r (dominating price effect) and decreasing for high values of r (dominating quantity effect).
Dynamics of equilibrium allocations
Two distinct problems arise in the model with asymmetric information. First, the set of equilibrium interest rates r(w) defined by equation 2 may be empty, i.e., an equilibrium with deterministic contracts may fail to exists. Second, r(w) may contain several elements, i.e., the pairs (w t , r t ) solving equations 2 and 4, for some given value of w t−1 , may be indeterminate.
Recall that the aggregate demands of loans are
Then, given w ∈ [0, 1], a credit market equilibrium with random contracts is a pair (r, ϑ), such that:
and ϑ = θ(r) if r ∈ [0,ᾱ]\S * , while ϑ ∈ [0, 1] otherwise. With some abuse of notation, we keep denoting with r(w) the non empty set of values of r solving equation 6. When S * = ∅, a temporary equilibrium with deterministic contracts may not exists for some values of w, i.e., r(w) may be empty. The reason is simple. Consider an arbitrarily small interval around r * , I(r * ). By definition of switching point, for r ∈ I(r * ), r < r * , optimal contracts are pooling (separating), while for r ∈ I(r * ), r > r * , optimal contracts are separating (pooling). Thus, at r * , the demand of loanable funds changes discontinuously from B p (r * ) to B s (r * ).
When market clearing requires random contracts, i.e., when r(w) ∈ S * , ϑ(w) will denote the market clearing mixing parameter. Moreover, for κ = p, s, we denote with r κ (w) the set of solutions to B j (r) = w and, for r * i ∈ S * , w κ i = B j (r * i ). The proof of the above proposition can be found in Appendix 2. By proposition 4, B p (r) is non increasing and, then, the set of solutions to the above equation, r p (w), is either a singleton or empty. Hence, by proposition 1, S * = ∅ is a sufficient condition for the uniqueness of the equilibrium interest rate r(w) = r p (w).
On the other hand, B s (r) may be a non monotone function. In fact, notice that
By proposition 4, ∂B j /∂r ≤ 0, for j = H, L, and B H > B L . However, by claim 5, ∂λ s /∂r cannot be signed and, hence, B s (r) may not be monotonic. Hence, r s (w) may be a non trivial correspondence. This problem can only arise when λ s (r) is increasing. In this case, a rise in the opportunity cost of lending has two effects on the aggregate demand for loans. On the one hand, B s (r) falls for given λ because borrowers get a smaller loan size. On the other hand, B s (r) rises because the proportion of risky borrowers increases and these are the borrowers who get a larger loan size when contracts are separating. Hence, when S * = ∅, r(w) may be a correspondence.
Avoiding multiplicity
Proposition 6 leaves open the possibility of multiple credit market equilibria and clarifies that multiplicity may occur under the following two distinct possibilities:
(b) r s (w) is a non empty set with at least two distinct elements, r and r , such that θ(r) = θ(r ) = 1;
(a) θ(r p (w)) = 0 and θ(r s (w)) = 1 (and/or, θ(r(w)) ∈ (0, 1)).
Case (a) never arises when the set-up cost e is large enough. In particular, let A s (e) = {r : θ(r) = 1}. Then, we can state the following.
Proposition 7
There is a large enough valueê such that, for all e ≥ê, λ s (r) is a decreasing function in A s (e) and r s (w) ∩ A s (e) is decreasing in w.
Proof. In the previous section we have shown that
By direct computations, ∂λ s (r )/∂r < 0 for r >r(µ) =ᾱ µ 1 − (1 − µ) 1/2 . Moreover, by proposition 2, the first switching point r * 1 is a strictly increasing function of e. Hence, there existsê such that, for e ≥ê, r * 1 (e) ≥r(µ). By the definition of the map B s (.) and by the implicit function theorem, ∂λ s (r )/∂r < 0 implies ∂B s (r )/∂r < 0. Then, since A s (e) ⊂ [r * 1 (e),ᾱ], ∂B s (r )/∂r < 0 for r ∈ A s (e), e ≥ê. The latter and the definition of market clearing imply the thesis.
Q.E.D.
In turn, case (b) never arises when the number of switching points is not greater than 1 and r s (w) ∩ A s (e) is decreasing in w. In particular, we can state the following proposition. 
Proof.
If S * = ∅, the proposition is trivial. Hence, suppose that S * = {r * }. By proposition 1, optimal contracts are pooling for r ∈ [0, r * ) and separating for r ∈ (r *
Consider w ∈ (w s , w p ). Evidently, the random contract c θ(w) = (c s (r * ), c p (r *
, w p ). However, for r < r * , optimal contracts are pooling, while, for r > r * , they are separating.
Recall that there exists a value e o > 0 such that S * = ∅ for all e ≥ e o (cf. proposition 2) and that, if sg(s)/G(s) ≤ 1, S * contains a single switching point r * (cf. proposition 3). In either one of these cases (by proposition 8) we can rule out any multiplicity arising from the coexistence of separating and pooling contracts for a given w. Hence, multiplicity may only arise from the non monotonicity of B s (r). By proposition 7, we can state the following proposition, almost as a corollary of propositions 6, 7 and 8. Proof. By the assumptions, S * is either empty or it contains a unique point r * . If ϑ(w) = 0, λ ϑ(w) (r(w)) = λ p (r p (w)) and, hence, it is an increasing function of w (just recall that λ p (r) is decreasing and r p (w) is decreasing in w). If ϑ(w) = 1, λ ϑ(w) (r(w)) = λ s (r s (w)) where, by the assumption e ≥ê and proposition 7, λ s (r) is decreasing and r s (w) is decreasing. It follows that λ ϑ(w) (r(w)) is again an increasing function of w. Now let ϑ(w) ∈ (0, 1), r(w) = r * , then, by the law of large number and proposition 6, we have
where ϑ(w) is the linearly decreasing function defined in proposition 6. Now we can show that, if S * = ∅, λ p (r * ) > λ s (r * ). In fact, by the definition of switching point:
Using again the definition of a switching point: Intertemporal equilibria when r(w) is unique.
The analysis of the dynamic behavior of the economy is carried out by imposing uniqueness of credit market equilibria. At the end of the paper, we will discuss what consequences may derive from the existence of discontinuous regime switches (i.e., discontinuities in the relation between w and the equilibrium opportunity cost r(w)). From now on in this section we study economies that satisfy the assumption of proposition 9, i.e.,
By proposition 9, we can express the aggregate set-up cost, M e (r(w)) as an increasing function of w ∈ [0, 1] denoted by m e (w). Thus, substituting equation 2 into equation 4, the equilibrium dynamics of the wage rate w t is defined by the following equation:
The equilibrium sequence of wage rates is generated by equation 8 provided that w t ≤ 1, for all t (otherwise, the capacity constraint of the intermediate good technology is binding and Φ e no longer describes the equilibrium of the system). This is an immediate consequence of the next proposition, which is proved in appendix 2.
Proposition 10 Under assumption 7:
• Φ e (w) is increasing in [0, 1];
• Φ e (w) has at least one fixed point w * e in [0, 1) such that Φ e (w * e ) < 1;
• w * e < w * 0 .
By proposition 10, all the stationary states of the asymmetric information economy are smaller than w * 0 , the stationary state of the benchmark model. Furthermore, Φ e (w) is increasing in [0, 1] , it has at least one fixed point w * e ∈ [0, 1) with Φ e (w * e ) < 1, and since Φ 0 (w) > Φ e (w), by assumption 6, 1 > Φ e (1). Hence, for any given initial condition w ∈ (0, 1), the equilibrium sequence of wage rates converges monotonically to some steady state w * e < w * 0 . Hence, for any initial condition in (0, 1), the equilibrium sequence of wage rates {w t } is bounded above by 1.
Evidently, since there are no more restrictions on the shape of the map Φ e (w) other than the ones specified in proposition 10, we cannot rule out the existence of multiple fixed point. In this case, the equilibrium sequence may converge to different steady states for different initial conditions and asymmetric information may be responsible for the existence of "poverty traps" that would otherwise be absent in the model.
Since λ is an increasing function of w, the monotonicity of the sequence of equilibrium wages translates into monotonicity of the equilibrium proportion of bad projects. Figure  1 shows a diagrammatic representation of the equilibrium dynamics of the model with full and asymmetric information.
By inspection of the map Φ e , a rise in w generates two opposite effects. On one hand, higher wages increase the amount of loanable funds, the production of materials, and, hence, of the marginal productivity of labor. The latter reinforces the initial increase in wages. This is the only mechanism at work in the benchmark model when initial wages fall short of their steady state value. However, in the asymmetric information model, higher wages produce a fall in the opportunity cost of lending and, hence, an increase in the proportion of bad projects and, as a consequence of the latter, an increase in the amount of resources lost as set-up cost. This is the novel mechanism at work. If the effect of w on λ is positive and strong, this mechanism damps business fluctuations (relatively to the full information benchmark), thereby introducing a role for asymmetric information somewhat in contrast with the standard view in this literature. Most importantly, this phenomenon may occur (locally around a steady state) irrespectively of whether the equilibrium contracts are separating or pooling 3 . Finally, the same mechanism is responsible for the (possible) existence of multiple steady states.
To evaluate the long-run effect of a productivity shock with asymmetric information, consider a stable steady state w * e and define the elasticity of a change in A as:
where Φ e (w * e ) = AW (.)ᾱ 1 − eλg(λ) ∂λ ∂w
and (e) is well defined and positive by the stability of w * e . Hence, a stable steady state λ * e is increasing in the productivity parameter A. Furthermore, since Φ e (w * e ) defines the approximate "speed of adjustment" to the steady state wage rate, (e) is positively correlated with the speed of adjustment of real wages to their steady state value.
We can compare the steady state effects of a productivity shock in the asymmetric information model relative to the full information case by looking at the values of (e) and (0). The results are summarized by the following proposition.
Proposition 11 (e) < (0) for e > 0 iff:
where λ and ∂λ/∂w are computed at r(w * e ).
Proposition 11 states that, if inequality 9 is satisfied, a productivity shock has a relatively smaller impact on steady state real wages and output in the asymmetric information than in the full information model. How should we interpret these results? The right hand side of the inequality in proposition 11 is non positive for all convex wage functions W (.). In these cases the inequality is always verified. When the wage function is strictly concave, (e) < (0) requires a sufficiently high value of ∂λ/∂w at w * e . In the latter case, the speed of adjustment with e > 0 tends to be smaller because of adverse selection (i.e., the adverse effect of λ on output), but it tends to be higher because of concavity (the steady state capital stock with asymmetric information is smaller than the capital stock with full information).
Endogenous cycles
We now give conditions under which separating and pooling contracts may coexist for the same w in a credit market equilibrium and we point out a general property of any selection criterium that could resolve this multiplicity problem.
A selection criterium E is a rule assigning to w ∈ [0, 1] a unique credit market equilibrium (ϑ E , r E ), (remember that, by definition of equilibrium, ϑ E ∈ θ(r E )). We define this rule as a map E(w) = (r E (w), ϑ E (w)).
The existence of multiple market clearing contracts may generate, at some w, a "sudden" discontinuity in the behavior of the equilibrium interest rate r(w) (and, hence, of the proportion of risky contracts λ and the production of materials z as functions of w). The discontinuity may be induced, for instance, by a change of regime, i.e., a switch from a deterministic pooling to a deterministic separating contract (or vice versa), or by a discontinuous choice among the multiple separating equilibria. Let λ E (w) be the credit market equilibrium proportion of H-projects generated by the selection criterium E. More precisely, we give the following definition.
Definition 3 Given a selection E, we say that there is a discontinuous switch at w , if
(r E (w), λ E (w)) is discontinuous at w . Now recall that n denotes the cardinality of the set of switching points r * i ∈ (0,ᾱ). The following proposition states that discontinuous switches always occur when n ≥ 2.
Proposition 12 Let n > 1. Then, (i) there exists a multiplicity of market clearing contracts, (ii) for each selection E(w) there exists a w at which there is a discontinuous switch.
Proof.
It is sufficient to analyze the case n = 2. It is immediate from the argument, that this is without loss of generality. Since the case in which r s (w) is not a singleton for r ∈ A s can only make multiple equilibria and discontinuous selections more likely, we will also assume e ≥ê. By proposition 7, this assumption guarantees that r s (w) ∩ A s is a decreasing function. Finally, to save notation, we just use r s (w) to denote r s (w) ∩ A s .
For with θ(r * 2 ) = ϑ * i (w), are all optimal and they all satisfy the market clearing requirement.
To prove (ii) we argue by contradiction. Evidently, if there exists a continuous selection for all w ∈ [0, 1], it must be
. However, since I 2 is pooling, the only possible contract that we can select for w ∈ [0, w s 2 ) is C(r) = (c s (r p (w)), c p (ρ p (w)), 1). Hence, for such a selection, there is a discontinuous regime switch at w s 2 .
Q.E.D. The last proposition implies that the lack of continuous selections is independent of the existence of multiple separating contracts. However, if r s (w)∩A s is a continuous (and decreasing) function and n ≤ 1, r(w) is, by proposition 9, a non increasing function and ϑ(w) is trivially continuous. Furthermore, proposition 3 provides a sufficient condition for n ≤ 1, while proposition 7 shows that e ≥ê suffices to make r s (w) ∩ A s a (decreasing) function.
To illustrate the consequences on the equilibrium dynamics of regime switching, we consider a specific example.
Suppose that e ≥ê, so that, by proposition 7, r s (w) is a decreasing function. It will be apparent that this assumption plays no role. Most importantly, suppose that S * = {r * 1 , r * 2 }, withᾱ > r * 2 > r * 1 > 0 and w
Remember that, in this situation, optimal contracts must assign θ(r) = 0 for r ∈ [0, r * 1 ) ∪ (r * 2 ,ᾱ] and θ(r) = 1, for r ∈ (r * 1 , r * 2 ). Since n > 1, by proposition 12 there is no selection criterium E making r E (w) a continuous function.
It will be sufficient, for our purposes, to define a selection criterium E in the interval [w s 2 , w Most importantly, the adopted selection criterium generates a discontinuity in the proportion of H-projects: as w crossesw from the right, λ(r E (w)) jumps upward discontinuously. This is shown in the next proposition:
Proof. By the market clearing conditions:
Hence, B p (r p (w)) is a convex combination of B L (r s (w)) and 1. Therefore, (w) ). Then, the definitions of λ p and λ s imply the thesis.
Q.E.D. This proposition points out a general problem with selection criteria for economies with n > 1. Every time the selection criterium implies a regime switch from separating to pooling contracts as w increases, the proportion of H-projects goes up abruptly. Although for n = 2 this type of regime switch is avoidable (i.e., it is always possible to construct selections where the switches are from pooling to separating), the phenomenon seems somewhat structural for high values of n.
Evidently, the discontinuity in λ(.) translates into a discontinuity of Φ e (w), as defined in equation 8. Since a sudden increase in λ generates a sudden decrease in the production of the material, the following inequality holds true
This discontinuity may be a source of endogenous dynamic fluctuations. In particular, the map Φ e (w) may not have a steady state w * e . If, given our adopted selection criterium, there is no steady state w * e , we have the following situation:
This implies that the equilibrium trajectory {w t ; t ≥ 0} permanently fluctuates in the interval (0, 1] for all initial conditions w 0 ∈ (0, 1]. Figure 2 shows a diagrammatic representation of a cycle of period 2. The example proves that the model can explain an endogenous reversion mechanism. Low wages induce borrowers to select good projects so as to produce higher wages in next periods. In turn, high wages induce agents to choose bad projects setting up the conditions for a downturn. It should be stressed, however, that discontinuous regime switches may as well generate the opposite type of discontinuity for the map Φ e (w). Namely, the curve representing this map may jump upward as w crosses a given threshold from the left. In this case we would expect multiple steady states.
Conclusions and Extensions.
Using a version of a celebrated model by Stiglitz and Weiss [16] , this paper shows that the interplay of moral hazard and adverse selection in the market for loans implies that risky and socially costly actions made by profit maximizing entrepreneurs may be more pervasive in booms other than recessions. Hence, by embedding the Stiglitz-Weiss model in a general equilibrium framework, we may argue that credit market imperfections do not necessarily amplificate the effects of exogenous shocks. Multiple steady states and endogenous fluctuations are a more likely phenomena. This is in contrast with what comes out from most of the literature in the field. For example, [1] , [2] and [12] show that asymmetric information or limited commitment in credit markets amplificate business cycle fluctuations. Our results show that business cycle theory may be very sensitive to the way information and market frictions in credit markets are modeled. Our model is admittedly very simple, mainly because we assume that contracts are single-period and borrowers have no endowment. In particular, a natural objection to this model is that we are overlooking the importance of the borrowers' balance sheet and the role of collateral. As a partial answer to this type of criticism, in appendix 4 we study the case in which entrepreneurs are endowed with some positive amount E < 1 of the consumption good in the first period of their life. In this case, contracts may include the following additional components: some amount W ∈ [0, E] to be invested by the borrower in a "secure deposit" (yielding the return r) and some payment V ≥ 0 to be delivered by the borrower to the lender in the case in which the project fails. We find that:
• W and V play no role in defining the optimal contracts in the sense that their value is either zero or left undefined in the optimal contract;
• credit rationing still occurs when E + w < 1;
• pooling contracts are independent of E when credit is rationed, i.e., B p < 1 − E;
• the range of r for which optimal contracts are pooling is increasing in E.
The key result is that pooling contracts are more likely to be optimal when borrowers have a (relatively) large endowment. The intuition is that a larger E reduces the lenders' exposure with high risk borrowers and, hence, their need to separate risky from safe types. To give a sense of the effects of introducing endowments on the type of contracts prevailing in the model, consider that, with the uniform distribution G(s) = s, optimal contracts are pooling for all r (and w) when
If we assume, as usual in business cycle models, that E is procyclical, we should expect pooling contracts to be more likely in booms, both because a high w implies a low r (as shown in section 4, optimal contracts are always pooling when r is small) and because E is larger.
Hence, the effect of introducing the endowment E is ambiguous. On the one hand, a large E may eliminate rationing along with any interesting dynamics of intertemporal equilibria. On the other hand, when E is not too big, the set of wage rates for which optimal contracts are pooling is larger and, provided that credit rationing still occurs (w < 1), this makes the prociclycality of λ more likely.
Appendix 1: Optimal contracts
In this appendix we derive the family of optimal (random) contracts C(r) for a given opportunity cost of lending r (in units of materials).
As anticipated in section 2, contracts are obtained by maximizing the borrowers' profit subject to the lenders' participation constraint. The presence of a continuum of borrowers' types allows for many possible and alternative choices of the Planner's objective function. We make this function equal to the profit of the most inefficient borrower, i.e., the borrower of type s = 1. When λ < 1 the profit of the least efficient borrower is π L (.), while his profit is π H 1 (.) when λ = 1. Since every borrower is free to select projects, our criterium is equivalent to the maximization of a "reservation" profit for all types of entrepreneurs.
Hence, for all given r ∈ [0,ᾱ], we seek triples C = (c s , c p , θ), with (c s , c p ) ≥ 0 and y ∈ [0, 1], maximizing:
subject to :
(ZPP)
The form of the objective function follows from the following consideration. If, at a separating contract c s = (c L , c H ), every borrower applies for the contract c H , then λ = 1. Hence, we can identify, without loss of generality, c s with the pooling contract c p = c H . By adopting this convention, we rule out the possibility that, at a separating contract, λ = 1.
Condition (CC) is the capacity constraint, (IC1) and (IC2) are the incentive compatibility constraints and (ZPS) is a NCS condition. By (ZPS) and (ZPP), contracts satisfy the standard participation constraint, i.e., the cost of lending cannot exceed the expected return of each contract in the optimal offer. Furthermore, given the adopted objective function, we need not write down explicitly the borrowers' individual rationality constraints. Since B κ = 0 (κ = H, L, p) is always feasible, it must be π L (c κ ) ≥ 0 (and hence π H (c κ ) ≥ 0) at any solution of the programming problem. These inequalities, together with the other constraints, imply
Hence, the (relevant part of) the feasible set is compact.
The separability in c s and c p , the linearity in θ of the objective function and the NCS condition imply that the optimality problem separates in two programming problems defining, respectively, optimal separating and optimal pooling contracts. More specifically, for given r, an optimal pooling contract c p is a solution to
while, an optimal separating contracts c = (c L , c H ) is a solution to
to: (CC), (IC1), (IC2), (ZPS).
In the sequel, c j (r) and π j (r), j = p, s, will denote the set of optimal solutions to and the value functions of the programs (P.κ), κ = s, p. If, at r, π p (r) > (<)π s (r), the optimal random contract implies θ(r) = 0 (θ(r) = 1) and it degenerates in the pooling (separating) contract. Optimal random contracts are non trivial lotteries over the two deterministic contracts only when π p (r) = π s (r). In such a situation, any θ ∈ [0, 1] is optimal, i.e., θ(r) = [0, 1]. It is evident that if, for instance, θ(r) = 0, the actual specification of the separating component is immaterial. However, it will be convenient and without loss of generality to specify the set of optimal contracts as the array C(r) = (c s (r), c p (r), θ(r) ). Since θ ∈ (0, 1) only when π p (r) = π s (r), the introduction of random offers does not increase the value of the objective function and it is inessential for optimality.
We denote by S * the set of values of r at which the function π s (r) − π p (r) is equal to zero and we call r * ∈ S * a switching point. In our model, for a generic set of values of the set up cost e, S * is either an empty or a finite set. We call a subset of R ++ generic if it is both open and of full Lebesgue measure. This is stated and proved formally in a later stage in this appendix (see lemma 4), since the proof requires some additional notions and results. From now on, we limit our attention to the generic set of set up costs for which the previous lemma holds true. Hence, S * is a finite collection of points, {r * 1 , ..., r * n } and, by convention, r * i < r * i+1 .
Proof of propositions 1, 4, 5.
The proof of proposition 1 is divided in three steps. In the first we characterize c s (r), in the second c p (r) and in the last θ(r). From now on we simplify the notation by setting
Step 1: optimal separating contracts. As already explained in the text, at an optimal separating contract, λ < 1. Thus optimal separating contracts must be a solution to the following problem:
As we have already observed, π L (c L ) ≥ 0 (and hence π H (c H ) ≥ 0) at any optimal solution, since B L = B H = 0, R j = α j is feasible. Furthermore, all additional constraints in the programming problem (P.s) are weak inequalities. Hence, the search for optimal separating contracts is in a compact region contained in the compact set
The following Lemma characterizes the properties of the unique optimal separating contract c s (r) = (c H (r), c L (r)) that solves problem (P.s).
Lemma 1 A contract c s (r) solving problem (P.s) is such that:
Proof. We break the argument in four steps. Let π * L be the value of the objective function with the proposed solution. Summing the two IC constraints, we get that the following inequality must be satisfied by any feasible c s :
In fact, if B κ < 1 for all κ ∈ {p, s}, we can increase the value of the objective function by increasing both B L and B H , while keeping their ratio constant so as to satisfy any constraint. (IV) p H R H = r. If, by contradiction, p H R H > r, by (III), R H can be decreased without contradicting any constraint and making both incentive compatibility constraints hold with a strict inequality. Then, B L can be increased without violating any constraint and increasing the value of the objective function. A contradiction.
However, since (IC1) is binding, we get
Since p L > p H , it suffices to select a negative and arbitrarily small ∆B L to generate a positive increase in the objective function. A contradiction.
Hence, an optimal solution to (P.s) must satisfy (II)-(IV) and the lemma is proved.
Q.E.D.
By the properties of the separating contract, it is readily verified that the proportion of H-projects is equal to:
The function λ s (r) is hump shaped, equal to zero at r = 0 and r =ᾱ and possibly greater than or equal to 1 for some r. Then, there is a closed subinterval I s = [r s 1 , r s 2 ] ⊂ (0,ᾱ), possibly empty, such that λ s (r) = 1, for r ∈ I s , i.e., no optimal contract can be separating for r ∈ I s (or, equivalently, separating and pooling contracts are, for all practical matters, indistinguishable). Now let π s (r) = max{π L (c s ), π H 1 (c s )} for c s in the constrained set defined by (CC), (IC1), (IC2), (ZPS). The above discussion implies that:
Step 2: optimal pooling contracts. At a pooling contract, λ p (r) = min{1, σB p R p }. When λ p (r) = 1 the contract is trivially defined by R p = r/p H and B p = 1. Otherwise, it is a solution to:
Once again, B = 0 is always feasible and all constraints in (P.p) are weak inequalities. Hence, the search for optimal pooling contracts is in a compact region contained in the compact set {(B p , R p ) : B p ∈ [0, 1] and R p ∈ [0, α H ]}. In the programming problem (P.p) neither the objective function is concave nor the constraint set is convex. However, assumption 1 makes (P.p) a convex programming problem. 1 for r ∈ I p , λ p (r) strictly increasing in [0,r) , strictly decreasing in (r,ᾱ] \ I p and λ p (0) = λ p (ᾱ) = 0;
Proof. Since both the objective function and λ p are monotonic in B, solutions in C p (r) satisfy (ZPP) with equality. Hence:
By equation 13 and the definition of λ, problem (P.p) can be restated as
Let Λ p (r) be the set of solutions to problem (P.p ). Notice that Q(0, r) = 0, T (0) < σr for r > 0 and ∂Q(0, r)/∂λ =ᾱ − r, ∂T (0)/∂λ = p Lᾱ > 0. Then, λ > 0 for all λ ∈ Λ p (r) with r ∈ (0,ᾱ) and Λ p (ᾱ) = Λ p (0) = {0}. Furthermore, by the maximum theorem, the continuity of T (.) and Q(.) and the compactness of the constrained set imply that Λ p (r) is an upper hemi continuous correspondence. Now we show that Λ p (r) = {λ p (r)}, where λ p (r) is a function. Since all λ ∈ Λ p (r) are positive, either ∂T (λ)/∂λ − r = 0 or ∂T (λ)/∂λ − r ≥ 0, where the second possibility implies T (λ) =ᾱσr/p L if λ < 1. Hence, for λ ∈ Λ p (r), ∂T (λ)/∂λ > 0. However, assumption 1 implies that Q(.) and T (.) are strictly concave in λ. Hence, the constraint set of P.p is the union of two disjoint intervals, I 1 = [0, ξ 1 (r)], I 2 = [ξ 2 (r), 1], where I 2 is possibly empty, ξ 1 (r) ∈ (0, 1] and ξ 1 (r) < ξ 2 (r). Since ∂T (0)/∂λ > 0, ∂T (ξ 1 (r))/∂λ > 0, ∂T (ξ 2 (r))/∂λ < 0. Since ∂T (.)/∂λ > 0 for λ ∈ Λ p (r), must be Λ p (r) ⊂ I 1 . Hence, the strict concavity of Q(.) and the convexity of I 1 imply that Λ p (r) = {λ p (r)} is a continuous function.
By the implicit function theorem, ξ 1 (r) is an increasing function of r. By the strict concavity of the objective function in (P.p ), there exists a unique η(r) such that ∂Q(η(r), r)/∂λ = 0. Then, λ p (r) = min{η(r), ξ 1 (r)}. Since ξ 1 (0) = 0, η(0) > 0, η(ᾱ) = 0, ξ 1 (r) is increasing, while η(r) is decreasing. Then, there is a subinterval 
Step 3: optimal contracts. We are now ready to characterize θ(r), thereby completing the study of the optimal contract (c s , c p , θ)(r). If π s (r) > π p (r) (π s (r) < π p (r)), the optimal contract is separating (pooling), i.e., θ(r) = 1 (θ(r) = 0). If r is such that π s (r) = π p (r), the random contract (c s (r), c p (r), θ) is optimal for all θ ∈ [0, 1]. By direct computations and by the previous Lemma, π s (0) = π p (0) =ᾱ, π s (ᾱ) = π p (ᾱ) = 0 and
Hence, there exists r * ∈ (0,ᾱ] such that π p (r) > π s (r) for r ∈ (0, r * ). This completes the proof of proposition 1.
We have now all the elements needed to characterize the properties of the set of switching points. We call a subset A ⊂ R ++ generic if it is both open and of full Lesbegue measure. The proof of the next Lemma is a trivial application of the joint transversality theorem. Proof. First we show that the lemma is true for e in a full Lebesgue measure set of R ++ . Then, we prove that this set is open as well.
Consider the function f (r, e) = π s (r, e) − π p (r, e), for e > 0. For each e > 0, f (ᾱ, e) = f (0, e) = 0. From step 3 in the proof of lemma , ∂f (0, e)/∂r < 0, and, hence, r = 0 is a locally isolated zero of f , for all e > 0. Furthermore, from the proof of proposition 2, ∂f (ᾱ, e)/∂r = 0, ∂ 2 π s (ᾱ, e)/∂r 2 = −2/(ᾱ(1 − µ) and ∂ 2 π p (ᾱ, e)/∂r 2 = −σ/ᾱ. Thus, for e ∈ K = {e > 0 : σ = 2/1 − µ}, ∂ 2 f (ᾱ, e)/∂r = 0. Hence, for each e ∈ K, r =ᾱ is a locally isolated zero of ∂f /∂r, and, since f (ᾱ, e) = 0,ᾱ a locally isolated zero of f (just take a second order Taylor expansion in a neighborhood ofᾱ). Now, consider the map f : (0, 1) × K → R. Bear in mind that we are restricting the domain of the map f to not include the points r =ᾱ and r = 0. Since, ∂π s /∂e = 0, while ∂π p /∂e < 0, the map f is transversal to zero. Let f e (r) denote the map f for given value of e. By the joint transversality theorem, there exists a full Lebesgue measure subset of K, K * , such that either f −1 e (0) = ∅ or, for r ∈ f −1 e (0), ∂f (r, e)/∂r = 0, for e ∈ K * . Thus, by the implicit function theorem, the solutions r * i are locally isolated. If they are not finite, they must have either r = 0 or r =ᾱ as accumulation points. However, this is excluded by the fact that both of them are locally isolated solutions of f (r, e) = 0. Hence, S * (e) is a finite set for all e ∈ K * .
In order to show that K * is open, pick a pointê ∈ K * . If f 
Proof of proposition 10.
First we show that the map Φ e is increasing in [0, 1] . By direct computations, m e (w) = eλg(λ)(∂λ/∂w) < 1. Hence, by proposition 9, Φ e (w) is increasing in the intervals [0, B s (r * )) and (B p (r * ), 1]. To conclude this part of the argument we have to show that, at the switching point r * ,
As we have shown in the proof of proposition 6, at the switching point, it is
Furthermore, integrating by parts (and taking into account that λ p (r * ) > λ s (r * ),
eGds.
Hence,
Since at both w = 0 and w = 1, m e (w) = m 0 (w), the assumption 6 guarantees the existence of a fixed point of Φ e , for e ≥ 0. This assumption also shows that Φ e (w * e ) < 1 for at least one fixed point w * e . Finally, w * e < w * 0 for e > 0 follows from Φ 0 (w) > Φ e (w) for e > 0.
Appendix 3: Optimality and decentralization
In this appendix we provide an answer to the question whether optimal contracts as defined in this paper arise as the equilibrium outcome of a competitive market. Within the pure adverse selection model (λ constant), Rothschild and Stiglitz [15] have shown that all Nash equilibria of a two stage insurance game are optimal within the class of contracts that satisfy the no cross subsidizing condition. The equilibrium contracts are always separating and they imply that the safe types (borrowers) are rationed. However, equilibria fail to exist when the proportion of safe borrowers in the total population is sufficiently high, i.e., when separating contracts are inefficient. In this case a pooling contract can always upset any pair of separating contracts. Moreover, within the two stage game framework (adopted by Rothschild and Stiglitz) pooling contracts are always upset by a separating contract attracting safe borrowers only. The possible lack of a Nash equilibrium has led some authors to propose different solution concepts or different structures for the game (e.g., [19] , [14] , [9] ).
Following [9] , we assume that intermediaries and borrowers play a three stage game. Intermediaries move first by making contract offers. At the second stage, borrowers can apply for at most one contract. At the third stage, intermediaries decide whether to accept or reject their applications after they observe the contract offers and the set of applications. Within the pure adverse selection model (with a NCS condition) Hellwig shows that a sequential Nash equilibrium always exists. In particular, pooling contracts are Nash equilibria whenever they Pareto dominate the separating pairs. Therefore, in the Hellwig game, Nash equilibrium contracts are always efficient. It can be shown that they can be obtained by maximizing a welfare function subject to the incentive compatibility constraints and the NCS condition. It turns out that this welfare function coincides with the profit of the safe borrowers.
The model with endogenous choice of projects analyzed in this paper is more general than the pure adverse selection model considered by Hellwig. However, we show that the same result holds true. Namely, the optimal contracts defined in the paper are (subgame perfect) Nash equilibrium contracts of a three stage Hellwig game.
There exists a finite number of intermediaries, i = 1, 2, ..., N and, for each i, the opportunity cost of lending equals the (given) interest factor r. Our goal is to show that the optimal contracts are subgame perfect Nash equilibrium contracts of the three stage game. We analyze a situation where all intermediaries make the same contract offers and we sketch an argument for the nonexistence of profitable deviating contract offers. By the same argument used in section 4, there is no loss of generality in restricting deterministic (deviating) contract offers to at most a pair of deterministic contracts, possibly identical. We also allow for contracts that are lotteries over a pooling contract and a pair of separating contracts.
Let c i (i ∈ {1, .., N}) be the contract offered by intermediary i. Then c i can be defined as c i = (c pi , (c Li , c Hi ), θ i ). If θ i = 0 (θ i = 1) the contract is deterministic and separating (pooling). When the contract is random, θ i ∈ (0, 1), and if the realization of the lottery is (c Li , c Hi ), borrowers indicate whether they choose c Li or c Hi . The game is played by (expected) profit maximizer intermediaries and borrowers. The three stages of the game are as follows: components of the lottery. In other words, intermediaries can reject or accept all applications for contract c 1p and/or all applications for c 1L or c 1H . Borrowers, after having observed the outcome of their applications, select the project to implement.
We assume that, when all intermediaries offer the same contracts, (a) each intermediary gets the same size 1/N of applications, (b) the proportion of high risk borrowers applying for contract k offered by intermediary i, λ k i , is independent of i. The consequence of (b) for the case where all intermediaries make the same optimal contract offers is that, for each i, λ k i is equal to the value of λ associated with the optimal contract. Since the gross rate of return on the optimal contracts is equal to r, intermediaries realize zero expected profits when they make the same optimal contract offers.
In the second stage entrepreneurs observe the available contracts and apply for at most one of them in order to maximize their profits. Hence, they have to select a contractapplication by anticipating which one of them will be accepted at the third stage of the game. To make this choice they argue by backward induction. If a contract yields negative profits to the intermediary, it is in his best interest to reject the applications to that contract. Thus, borrowers only apply for contracts that yield nonnegative profits to the intermediary. For deterministic contracts, backward induction implies that the possible deviating contracts must satisfy a NCS condition. A similar observation holds true for random contracts. After the realizations of the lotteries, the (ex-ante) pool of applicants is partitioned into three pools of applicants respectively associated to the deterministic contracts c j , with j = p, L, H. Since the intermediary can reject applications from any of these three pools, the three contracts must satisfy a NCS condition.
In lemma 6, 7 and 8, we are going to prove that an optimal contract offer is a Nash equilibrium. To simplify the argument we give the following definition of a "profitable deviating contract". It is understood that deviations are taken by intermediary i when everybody is playing the same optimal contract offer c * = (c p * , c s * , θ * ).
For given r and deviating contract c i = (c pi , (c Li , c Hi ), θ i ), let λ pi be the proportion of entrepreneurs adopting the H-project and belonging to the pool of applicants associated to contract c pi and λ si the proportion of entrepreneurs adopting the H-project and belonging to the pool of applicants associated to contract (c Li , c Hi ). Let also:
be the profits of intermediary i generated, respectively, by the pooling and separating components of the deviating contract c i and:
the profit to an entrepreneur s adopting the j-project (j = H, L) and selecting optimally the component of a separating pair.
Definition 4 A profitable deviation is a contract offer c i such that:
with at least one strict inequality, and U j (c i ) > U j (c * ) for some j ∈ {H, L}, where c * is the optimal contract offer.
Lemma 6
Suppose that, at r ∈ (0,ᾱ), it is θ * = 0 (the optimal contract is pooling). Then, there are no profitable deviating contracts.
Proof. We argue by contradiction. Suppose (with no loss of generality) that i = 1 is a deviating intermediary and let c 1 be a profitable deviation. Then, either (A) the deviating contract attracts borrowers adopting the L-projects, i.e., U L (c 1 ) > U L (c p * ), or (B) the deviating contract attracts borrowers adopting the H-projects, i.e., U H (c 1 ) > U H (c p * ).
Consider (A) and remember that c p * yields zero profits to the intermediaries (cf. section 4). If, after the deviation, intermediaries i > 1 accept the applications to contract c p * , they will attract entrepreneurs adopting the H-projects only. In this case c p * yields negative profits. Thus, in case (A) every i > 1 must reject the applications for c p and the deviating contract offer c 1 will attract the entire pool of borrowers. However,
and, by definition of profitable deviation, each contract offer c 1 makes nonnegative profits. This contradicts the assumption that c p * is an optimal contract. Now consider (B). After the deviation c 1 , only borrowers adopting the L-project apply for contract c p * . Thus, c p * yields now positive profits to intermediaries i > 1. In particular, the gross rate of return on c p * is p L R p * > r. Since c 1 makes nonnegative profits and
. This contradicts the optimality of c p * . Q.E.D.
Lemma 7
Suppose that, at r ∈ (0,ᾱ), it is θ * ∈ (0, 1). Then, there exist no profitable deviating contracts.
Proof. The argument is virtually identical to the one given in the previous lemma. Q.E.D.
Lemma 8
Suppose that, at r ∈ (0,ᾱ), it is θ * = 1 (the optimal contract is separating). Then, there exist no profitable deviating contracts.
Proof. We argue by contradiction. It is immediate to verify that c 1 cannot be a separating pair and, by the same argument, that c 1 cannot attract borrowers adopting j-project only. Hence, the only possible profitable deviations consist of contracts that attract the entire pool of applicants and are either (A) pooling or (B) random. Then, c 1 = (c 1p , (c 1L , c 1H ) , θ 1 ) and:
• c 1p , c 1L , and c 1H yield nonnegative profits (with at lest one of them yielding positive profits) to intermediary 1.
Evidently, it cannot be the case that either
) and c 1L yields strictly positive profits, otherwise we reach a contradiction. Hence, we are left with the following possibilities:
) and c 1p yields strictly positive profits. In the first instance the contradiction is immediate, in the second we are back to case (A).
Appendix 4: Collateral
In this appendix we show that the optimal contracts derived in our model would not change under the assumption that entrepreneurs have some endowment and that lenders were allowed to use this endowment to secure loans. Suppose that each borrower s ∈ [0, 1] is endowed with a positive amount E of the final good. Also, for logical consistency with our model, E can only be used as an input in the production of materials. All other assumptions defining technologies and borrower types are maintained. We now characterize contracts allowing for part of the borrowers' endowment to be used to "secure" the loan. More specifically, we consider a class of contracts defined by the array (B, W, T, V ). Each of the components of the contract is defined as follows:
• W ∈ [0, E] is the amount of the borrowers' endowment invested in a secure deposit yielding the opportunity cost of borrowing r.
• B ∈ [0, 1 − E − W ] is the loan size.
• T and V are, respectively, the payment by the borrower to the lender when the project succeeds and the payment by the lender to the borrower when the project fails. Since failure makes the borrower penniless, limited liability implies V ≥ 0.
For convenience, we define D = B − W and, from now on, a contract is characterized with an array c = (D, W, T, V ). A borrower with contract c invests E + D in one of the two projects. When the project succeeds, the borrower receives α j (E + D) + rW − T and the lender receives T . When the project fails, the borrower receives V and the lender receives rW − V . Evidently, by setting W = 0, T = RB and V = 0, we are back to the loan contracts defined in section 4. We start the analysis by studying a separating contract c s = {(B j , W j , T j , V j ), j = H, L}. The borrowers' expected profits from project j = H, L and contract i = H, L is:
and the lenders' non negative profit conditions now read:
Then, the optimal separating contract maximizes π L (c L ) subject to the following constraints:
where constraints (IC1) and (IC2) are s-invariant and take the following form:
for j = i and i, j = H, L. It can be easily show that, at optimality, the lenders' participation constraint (ZP S) is binding. Hence, an optimal separating contract must solve the following programming problem: maxᾱE + (ᾱ − r)B L s.t.:
where j = H, L. Using the standard arguments, it can be shown that (IC1) must be binding, B H = 1 − E and V L = 0. Hence,
Since the value of W (secured deposit) is unspecified, we can set W = 0 and claim that the loan sizes (B L , B H ) and the proportion of risky projects λ are the same as with E = 0, except for the multiplicative factor (1 − E). In particular, letting λ s (r, E) be the proportion of risky projects with an optimal separating contract, we get: The lenders' participation constraint now is:
Hence, λ = min{1, σ(T + V − rW )}. When σ(T + V − rW ) ≥ 1, the contractual problem reduces to the maximization of π H 1 (c p ) subject to the capacity and the lenders' participation constraint. Since the latter must be binding and λ = 1, we get: p H (rW − T ) + (1 − p H )V = −rD. By plugging this equation into π H 1 (c p ), we get π H 1 (c p ) =ᾱE + (ᾱ − r)D −ᾱe. In this case, we have to maximize π H 1 subject to the capacity constraint E + D ≤ 1 and the limited liability constraint V ≥ 0. Evidently, the optimal pooling contract has D = 1 − E, whereas the values of the remaining components T , V and W are irrelevant. By setting V = W = 0, the lenders' participation constraint becomes p H T = r(1 − E) = rD = rB, i.e., we are back to the optimal pooling contract described in the text, except that the loan size is now equal to 1 − E. Now consider the case σ(T + V − rW ) < 1. In this case, λ = σ(T + V − rW ). Manipulating the objective function and the relevant constraints, the search for an optimal pooling contract can be reduced to the search of a solution to the following problem: . The key observation is that any solution of the above problem has V = 0. This is trivial when (CC") is not binding, since the objective function is non increasing in V , for r ≤ᾱ. Now assume that (CC") is binding and define λ V as the value of λ satisfying (CC") with equality. Then,
where H(λ) = G(λ) + λg(λ). Notice that (1 − µ)H(λ V ) < 1 because of the second order conditions. It follows that
Hence, we can set V = 0 and restate the optimality problem as:
The programming problem above is exactly problem (P.p ) (cf. appendix 1) other than for the multiplicative factor (1−E) on the right hand side of equation (CC"). Here again, the value of W is irrelevant for the specification of the contract and we can set W = 0 with no loss of generality. Thus we can mimic the analysis already performed for the case E = 0. As before, we denote by ξ 1 (r, E) the smallest value of λ which makes the lender participation constraint binding. Evidently, ξ 1 (r, E) < ξ 1 (r, 0) = ξ 1 (r) and there exists a valuer E ∈ (0,ᾱ) such that B p (r, E) = 1−E, and λ p (r, E) = ξ 1 (r, E), for r ≤r(E), while (λ p (r, E), B p (r, E)) = (λ p (r, 0), B p (r, 0)) = (λ p (r), B p (r), for r ≥r(E). Moreover,r(1) =ᾱ, r(0) =r (as defined in appendix 1),r(E) ∈ (r(0),r(1)) for E ∈ (0, 1) andr(E) is increasing in E. The next proposition clarifies the relation between the profit of the pooling contracts with and without entrepreneurs endowments.
Proposition 14 π P (r, E) >ᾱE + (1 − E)π P (r), for E ∈ (0, 1) and r ∈ (0,ᾱ)
Proof. For r ≥ r(E), profits are π p (r, E) =ᾱE + π p (r, 0) =ᾱE + π p (r).
For r ≤ r(E), B p (r, E) = 1 − E and, hence,
Consider the interval (0,r] ⊂ (0,r(E)]. Then, since λ p (r) = ξ 1 (r), r ∈ (0,r), it suffices to show that ξ 1 (r)(1 − E) > ξ 1 (r, E), which is verified if T (λ)(1 − E) < T ((1 − E)λ). But this is equivalent to the condition (1 − E) ( Otherwise, it follows from B p (r, E) = (1− E) > (1 − E)B p (r) and η(r)(1 − E) > ξ 1 (r, E).
Q.E.D.
For separating contracts, π s (r, E) =ᾱE + (1 − E)π s (r), for r ∈ [0,ᾱ]. By the last proposition, (π p (r, E) − π s (r, E))/(1 − E) > (π p (r) − π s (r)). Hence, we can state the following For the uniform distribution G(s) = s, optimal contracts are always pooling for E ≥ 1 − e/4(1 − µ).
The analysis in this appendix shows that the introduction of borrowers' endowment E ∈ (0, 1) does not change the basic properties of the contracts studied for the case E = 0. Chan and Thakor [8] study the optimal contracts between borrowers and lenders in a model with both moral hazard and adverse selection, risk neutrality (of both borrowers and lenders) and unconstrained access to a collateral good. The authors prove that, when lenders maximize the borrowers' rent, the optimal contract involves no rationing of either type of borrowers and fully collateralized loans. Chan and Thakor study a partial equilibrium model where collateral is a good that cannot be used for investment. Applying this framework in our setting would require an additional storable good in the economy. In any case, for credit rationing to be absent in an optimal contract, it is crucial to assume that the borrowers' access to the collateral good is unconstrained. When firms have a limited amount of collateral and this amount is sufficiently low, credit rationing can still arise. This shows that the result obtained by Chan and Takor is not in contrast with our findings. In fact, we have rationing only if E < 1. 
